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THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES AS AFFECTED BY THE FAR-EASTERN QUESTION.¹

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Among the many remarkable *voltefaces* in the history of international relations, none is perhaps more interesting in itself or destined to be more far-reaching in its ultimate effects on the future of civilization than the changed attitude towards each other of the peoples and governments of England and the United States during recent years. Only a decade ago our people, almost to a man, were roused to a frenzy of patriotic fervor by President Cleveland's startling message of December, 1895, threatening England with war unless she consented to submit a boundary dispute between herself and Venezuela to arbitration. It then seemed as if the spirit of hatred and suspicion against England transmitted to us by our forefathers would never die out. This spirit had been kept alive after the wars of the Revolution and of 1812 by a variety of real and imaginary grievances, including trade rivalries and boundary disputes, and it was again renewed during and after the Civil War as a result, among other things, of the Trent Affair and the Alabama and Behring Sea controversies.

But now we realize that a great change for the better has taken place in the relations between the two greatest branches of the so-called Anglo-Saxon race, or rather between the parent trunk and its largest branch. This change is so obvious to every one that I have very little fear of arousing dissent when I assert that there exists an unspoken but genuine friendship, based upon mutual sympathies and interests, be-

¹ Special acknowledgment is due to Dr. Asakawa whose excellent work entitled "The Russo-Japanese Conflict" has frequently served as a guide to the documents, and to Mr. Louis Gray for assistance in the preparation of this paper.

tween the peoples of England and the United States. Although this silent understanding has as yet found no adequate expression either in words or acts, it has affected the formal relations between the two governments and is stronger in purpose and wider in scope than mere words or a formal agreement could possibly make it. There is a growing conviction in both countries, not merely that each power will, in the future, refrain from attempting to injure the vital interests of the other, but that neither would permit serious harm to the other at the hands of a third power, and that both will try to work together in friendly rivalry at the solution of the great problems set by modern civilization.

Let us now ask ourselves, what have been the main factors in bringing about this changed attitude towards each other of the peoples of these two countries? I have neither the time nor the qualifications necessary for conducting an inquiry into what may be called its deeper causes, which some may find in economic forces and others perhaps may ascribe to psychological factors. It is my allotted task to point out one factor in this process which I believe to be extremely important, and in the discussion of which one has, at any rate, the advantage of being able to appeal to the support of public documents. The Parliamentary Blue Books on China, issued during the years 1898-1904, and the volumes on the Foreign Relations of the United States, covering this same period, contain ample evidence which tend to prove that the relations between England and the United States have been greatly affected by the Far Eastern question during the past decade. It is the purpose of this paper to try to show how the co-operation of England, Japan, and the United States in the Far East in recent years has strengthened the friendship between the two countries so auspiciously formed during the Spanish-American War.

It may not be out of place, however, before entering upon my main theme, to emphasize the fact that, as far as the people of the United States are concerned, this friendship or change of heart—a change of heart amounting almost to a conversion—had its main source or origin in the friendly and sympathetic attitude toward us assumed by the people and government of

Great Britain during the Spanish-American War. During that war it apparently dawned upon the people of the United States for the first time that, among European peoples, the English alone had any real sympathy with, or even understanding of, our actual aims and motives in undertaking to drive the Spaniards out of Cuba. Although England's sympathy with our policy during the Spanish-American War was not reciprocated by us during the Boer War, the attitude of our government was perfectly correct during that struggle, and the interests of Great Britain in South Africa were entrusted to the American consul at Pretoria, as the interests of the United States had been entrusted to the British legation at Madrid during the previous war.

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands at the close of the Spanish-American War gave us a definite foothold and greatly increased our interests in the Orient, and imposed upon us some of the burdens and responsibilities of an Asiatic power. At that time (in 1898) China was in process of partition or dismemberment into "spheres of interest" and "leases" by leading European powers. The influence of Russia was then all-powerful at Peking; for, as a result of her successful intervention in the Chinese-Japanese War and by guaranteeing a four per cent loan to China of 400,000,000 francs, Russia had placed China under a debt of fear and gratitude.

Following the example of Germany, who had exacted from China the lease of the bay of Kiao-Chau, along with valuable mining and railway privileges in the province of Shan-tung, as indemnity for the murder of two German priests, and using this bad example as a pretext, Russia had secured (on March 27, 1898) the lease of Port Arthur, as also the concession of a new railway in southern Manchuria in addition to the valuable concessions which she had already obtained in 1896.

Great Britain did not even enter a formal protest against these immoral and high-handed proceedings;² but "in order

² Great Britain failed to secure the opening of Port Arthur to the world, but Talien-wan was made an open port. On January 17, 1898, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, had declared emphatically in a public speech that the door must not be closed

to restore the balance of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li," the British Government leased and occupied Wei-hai-Wei, opposite Port Arthur—an act which, be it said in passing, met with the approval of Japan.³ France also demanded and obtained as her share of the spoils the lease of the Kwang-Chau Bay in southern China.

The principle of the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire had thus been violated in the most open and flagrant manner by Germany, Russia and France; and Great Britain, too, had been, albeit reluctantly, forced to follow suit and abandon her weak and apparently half-hearted attempts to uphold that policy in the Far East. On April 28, 1899, England even entered into an agreement with Russia engaging "not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government." Russia, on her part, engaged, in similar terms, not to seek any railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tse in behalf of Russian subjects.⁴

On October 16, 1900, while she was still engaged in her struggle with the Boers, England even entered into an agree-

in China. He said that the British government did "not regard China as a place of conquest or acquisition by any European or other power," and that it was "absolutely determined at whatever cost, even—and I wish to speak plainly—if necessary at the cost of war, that that door shall not be shut." See London *Times* for January 18, 1898. In a communication to Sir N. O'Connor, dated March 28, 1898, Lord Salisbury said, "Speaking generally, it may be said that the policy of this country is effectively to open China to the commerce of the world and that our estimate of the action of other powers in the Far East depends on the degree to which it promotes or hinders the attainment of this object. It follows from this that the occupation of territory by foreign powers is to be judged by the results, direct and indirect, immediate and remote, which it is likely to have on the commercial interests of the world, and the right of all nations to trade within the limits of the Chinese Empire on equal terms." Parliamentary Blue Book on *China*, No. 1 (1898), No. 133.

³ *China*, No. 1 (1899), Nos. 35, 49, 79, 81, 107, etc.

⁴ For the text of the Anglo-Russian agreement, see *China*, No. 2 (1899), No. 138.

ment with Germany in which, it is true, both powers disclaimed territorial designs upon China, and mutually engaged to uphold the principle of the open-door there; but it was also stipulated that "in case of another power making use of complications in China, in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China."⁵ By this agreement the principle of a balance of power in the Far East was practically suggested as a possible alternative or substitute for that of territorial integrity.

It will thus be seen that China was in sore need of a champion⁶ when Secretary Hay stepped out upon the arena of Asiatic politics and issued his now famous Circular Note of September 6, 1899, to the powers in order to "maintain an open market for all the world's commerce and to remove dangerous sources of international irritation." Mr. Hay instructed our American representatives abroad to endeavor to obtain from each of the powers claiming "spheres of interest" in China formal assurances to the following effect: (1) that it would not interfere with any treaty port or with the vested interest of any nation within a so-called "sphere of interest" or leased territory which such nation may have in China; (2) that it would maintain the Chinese treaty tariff (except in "free ports") under Chinese management, *i. e.*, to guarantee equality of treatment for all nations under the most-favored-nation clause; and (3) that there shall be equality of treatment for all nations in respect to harbor dues and railroad charges.⁷ By March 20, 1900, favorable replies from all the

⁵ For this agreement and the correspondence relating to it, see *China*, No. 5 (1900), No. 1.

⁶ In 1898-99 China, or rather British interests in China, had found a strong champion in Lord Beresford who published the results of his investigation and observations in China in 1899. His work, which appears to have been widely read, bore the significant title of "The Break-up of China." Lord Beresford's mission, which was of an essentially commercial character, was however, not an official one.

⁷ See *House Doc.* (Foreign Relations, 1899), 56th Congress, first session, pp. 131 ff.

powers concerned—Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia,⁸ and Japan—had been received, and Mr. Hay was able to announce that the consent of each nation consulted would be considered “final and definite.”

In his communication of September 22, 1899, to Lord Salisbury, our ambassador at the Court of St. James, Mr. Choate, called special attention to the fact that the interests of England and the United States in the maintenance of trade and commerce in the East differed “not in character, but in degree only,” and he observed that our President conceived such action as that asked for “to be in exact accord with the uniformly declared policy and traditions” of Great Britain. “He (the President) understands it to be the settled policy and purpose of Great Britain not to use any privileges which may be granted to it in China as a means of excluding any commercial rivals, and that freedom of trade for it in that empire means freedom of trade for all the world alike. Her Majesty’s Government, while conceding by formal agreements with Germany and Russia the possession of ‘spheres of influence or interest’ in China, in which they are to enjoy special rights and privileges, particularly in respect to railroads and

⁸ The reply of Russia had not been without a significant reservation. “As to the ports now opened, or hereafter to be opened to foreign commerce by the Chinese Government, and which lie beyond the territory leased to Russia, the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself, and the Imperial Government (of Russia) has no intention whatever of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of other foreigners.” But “in so far as the territory leased by China to Russia is concerned, the Imperial Government (of Russia) has already demonstrated its firm intention to follow the policy of the ‘open door’ by creating Dalny (Ta-lien wan) a free port; and if at some future time that port, although remaining free itself, should be separated by a custom-limit from other portions of the territory in question, the custom duties would be levied, in the zone subject to the tariff, upon all foreign merchandise without distinction as to nationality.” All the powers except Italy made their assent to the desired declarations conditional upon a similar assent on the part of all the other interested powers. The reply of Great Britain was the most explicit and comprehensive, for she specifically included “the leased territory of Wei-hai-Wei and all territory in China which may hereafter be acquired by Great Britain by lease or otherwise, and all spheres of interest now held or that may hereafter be held in China.” See *House Doc.*, cited above.

mining enterprises, has at the same time sought to maintain what is commonly called the 'open-door' policy, to secure to the commerce and navigation of all nations equality of treatment within such 'spheres.' The maintenance of this policy is alike urgently demanded by the commercial communities of our two nations, as it is justly held by them to be the only one which will improve existing conditions, enable them to maintain their positions in the markets of China, and extend their future operations." ⁹

During the Boxer uprising of 1900, as also during the long negotiations which followed, all the powers interested in the fate of China repeatedly pledged themselves to maintain the "open door" and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. The latter principle was especially urged by Russia, but was at the same time being violated by that power in Manchuria, which was overrun and occupied by Russian troops. These measures of military occupation were, however (as the Russian Government was careful to explain to the powers ¹⁰), intended to be merely "temporary" in their nature, and had been solely dictated by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government" [of Russia]. The world was assured that as soon as peace was restored and the safety of the Manchurian railway secured "Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from the Chinese territory, *provided such action did not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other powers.*" ¹¹

During the campaign of 1900, as also during the negotiations which led up to the signing of the Peace Protocol of September 7, 1901, between China and the Allied Powers, the relations between England, Japan, and the United States were

⁹ Blue Book on *China*, No. 2 (1900) No. 1. Cf. *House Doc.* cited above.

¹⁰ See *China*, No. 1 (1901), No. 256. Cf. *House Doc.* of 56th Congress, 2nd session (Foreign Rel. 1900) pp. 304 f.

¹¹ The *italics* are the author's.

particularly close, and they appear, in the main, to have acted in harmony.¹²

The support of the United States and Japan¹³ aided Great Britain in checking the aggressive tendencies of Russian policy in northern China during this period, and this assistance must have been especially gratifying to England at a time when she was engaged in her great struggle with the Boers in South Africa. For had England been compelled to fight the battle of the "open door" and territorial integrity of China alone during this crisis in her history, she must inevitably have yielded to a coalition between Russia, France, and Germany, who would probably have seized this favorable opportunity to continue or complete the process of dismembering the Chinese Empire which they had so successfully begun a few years before. In that case the gates of China would have been closed to the rest of the world, and the greater part, at least, of the immense potential resources of that vast country and its teeming population must have fallen a prey to the sys-

¹² So, *e. g.*, in July, 1900, the British and American admirals voted against the proposal to give Russia the control of the railway line from Tongku to Tientsin which the Russians had siezed and were operating in spite of the fact that it was mortgaged to British bond holders. On the strength of the decision of the Admirals, the Russians claimed the whole railway from Taku to Peking. Russian and British troops almost came to an open conflict at one stage of this dispute. See *Blue Book on China*, No. 7 (1901), *passim*, especially No. 4.

The United States was particularly active in securing a reduction of the amount of the indemnity imposed upon China. The United States and Great Britain both strongly opposed the Russo-French proposal of a joint guaranteed loan. See *China*, No. 1 (1902) *passim*, especially Nos. 136 and 173.

On the other hand the United States, Russia, and Japan opposed the extreme demands of England and Germany on the Chinese Government in the matter of the capital punishment of Prince Tuan, Duke Lan, and Tung-fu Hsiang. See *China*, No. 6, (1901) *passim*, especially Nos. 55, 57, 67, 83, 119, 135, 141, 172, 193, 205 and 233.

¹³ The policy of Japan appears at this time to have been much less aggressive than it was a few years later. Inasmuch as Japan furnished more than her proportion of troops for the relief of the Legations at Peking during the Boxer uprising, her government asked for and received financial assistance from England. See *China*, No. 3 (1900), Nos. 265 ff.

tematic commercial exploitation and exclusive protective systems of these countries.¹⁴

In February, 1901, Japan, Great Britain and the United States made similar representations to China against her signing the Alexieff-Tsêng Agreement for the pacification of Manchuria. The United States, *e. g.*, reminded China of the "impropriety, inexpediency, and even extreme danger to the interests of China, of considering any private territorial and financial engagements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the powers now engaged in negotiations."¹⁵ In reply to an appeal from the Emperor of China, who declared that "it was impossible for China alone to incur the displeasure of Russia by remaining firm," Great Britain and Japan remonstrated in March, 1901, against the signing of the drastic Lamsdorff-Yang-Yü Convention, which would probably have resulted in the complete Russianization of Manchuria."¹⁶

On February 3, 1902, Secretary Hay lodged a vigorous protest against the terms of a proposed agreement between Russia and China, according to which the Russo-Chinese Bank was to be given a practical monopoly of all railway and

¹⁴ On March 15, 1901, the German Chancellor openly declared in a speech in the Reichstag that "there were no German interests of importance in Manchuria," and that "the fate of that province was a matter of absolute indifference to Germany." But he added that Germany had informed China that "she would deprecate the conclusion at the present time of any agreement with no matter which power, which would impair China's financial resources." Cited by McCarthy, *The Coming Power*, p. 105. Cf. Scott to Lansdowne in *China*, No. 6 (1901), No. 211. Of course Germany would have demanded concessions elsewhere in China in return for her complaisance toward Russia in Manchuria. The relations between Russia and France during this period are too well-known to admit of any doubt as to the attitude of France.

¹⁵ *China*, No. 2 (1904), No. 19. See also Nos. 8 and 15 for the attitude of Great Britain and Japan. Germany also made representations to China on this occasion, but with greater reservation and in somewhat different language. See *China*, *op. cit.*, Nos. 12 and 13.

¹⁶ *China*, No. 6, (1901), Nos. 202 and 207. See also *China*, No. 2 (1904) Nos. 16, 21, 24, 28, 34, etc. The United States does not seem to have remonstrated on this occasion. At least such action does not appear in the published documents. She probably considered her former representations sufficient for the purpose.

mining concessions in Manchuria. It is highly probable that similar protests were made by Great Britain and Japan, but no reference to such action appears in the published documents.¹⁷ There can, however, be no doubt but that Secretary Hay's protest was in accordance with the views of these two powers.¹⁸ He reminded the Russian and Chinese Governments of the repeated assurances given by Russia of her devotion to the principle of the "open door" in China, and said: "The Government of the United States can view only with concern an agreement by which China concedes to a corporation the exclusive right to open mines, construct railways, or other industrial privilege; that such monopoly would distinctly contravene treaties of China with foreign powers, affect rights of citizens of the United States by restricting rightful trade, and tend to impair the sovereign rights of China and diminish her ability to meet international obligations; that other powers will probably seek similar exclusive advantages in other parts of the Chinese Empire, which would wreck the policy of absolutely equal treatment of all nations in regard to navigation and commerce in the Chinese Empire; and that, moreover, for one power to acquire exclusive privileges for its nationals conflicts with assurances repeatedly given to the government of the United States by the Russian ministry for foreign affairs of a firm intention to follow the policy of the "open door" in China, as advocated by the United States and accepted by all the powers having commercial interests in China."¹⁹

¹⁷ Asakawa (The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 194) calls attention to this fact.

¹⁸ The attitude of the British Government was clearly indicated in a conversation between Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Choate on February 11, 1902. See Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay in *House Doc.* of 57th Congress, 2nd session, (For. Rel. 1902-3), pp. 511-512.

¹⁹ Paraphrase of telegram to Mr. Conger on February 11, 1902. See *House Doc.* of 57th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1, pp. 275-76. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-28. Count Lambsdorff's reply to this note is very interesting and significant. He reminded Secretary Hay of the fact that "negotiations carried on between two entirely independent states are not subject to be submitted to the approval of other powers." He gave the assurance that Russia had "no thought of attacking the principle of the 'open door'".

The situation in the Far East was greatly affected by the defensive alliance between England and Japan, signed on January 30, 1902. This alliance was induced by the discovery, as the result of frequent interchanges between the two governments, that "their Far Eastern policy was identical," and it declared for the "open door" and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire.²⁰ It greatly strengthened the hands of both governments in dealing with China and Russia, and, although the United States made no declaration to that effect,²¹ it was well known that our sympathies and interests were also "identical" with those of Great Britain and Japan in the Orient.

This agreement appears to have had the desired effect. On April 8, 1902, Russia concluded with China the now famous convention providing for the gradual evacuation of the whole

as that principle is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia," and that Russia had "no intention whatever to change the policy followed by her in that respect up to the present time. If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other foreign corporations. . . . It is impossible to deny to an independent state the right to grant to others such concessions as it is free to dispose of and I have every reason to believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy for the Imperial Government to deny to Russian companies that support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates of their own nationalities." *Ibid.*, p. 929.

²⁰ Lord Lansdowne to Sir Claude MacDonald, *The British Parliamentary Papers for Japan*, No. 1, (1902).

²¹ The United States Government officially disclaimed all knowledge of the negotiations between Great Britain and Japan leading up to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement; but in a memorandum, dated March 22, 1902, it expressed its gratification in seeing in the Russo-French Declaration of March 16, 1902, as also in the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, "renewed confirmation of the assurances it has heretofore received from each of them regarding their concurrence with the views which this government has from the outset announced and advocated in respect to the conservation of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire as well as of Korea, and the maintenance of complete liberty of intercourse between those countries and all nations in matters of trade and industry." See *House Doc.* of 57th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 930, 931.

of Manchuria in three successive withdrawals within eighteen months after the date of the agreement, "*provided that no disturbances arise and that the action of other powers place no obstacle*" in the way of such withdrawal.²²

After a very partial fulfillment of her engagement to withdraw from Manchuria,²³ Russia made seven additional demands upon China in April, 1903, as a condition for the completion of the process of evacuation. These were of a highly exclusive nature, and included stringent measures for closing Manchuria to the economic enterprises of all foreigners except Russians and for preventing the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria without the consent of Russia.²⁴ These demands were in direct opposition to the principle of the "open door," and it is not in the least surprising that their publication was followed by firm representations at Peking on the part of Japan, Great Britain, and the United States.²⁵

²² The *italics* are the author's. For the French text and the English translation of this Convention see Blue Book on *China*, No. 2, (1904), Nos. 54 and 51. At the same time Mr. Lessar handed to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries a note in which he declared that "if the Chinese Government, in spite of their positive assurances, should, on any pretext, violate the above conditions, the Imperial Government [of Russia] would no longer consider themselves bound by the provisions of the Manchurian agreement, nor by its declarations on this subject, and would have to decline to take all responsibility for all the consequences which might ensue." See *China*, cited above, No. 51, inclosure, p. 38.

²³ By October 8, 1902, at the end of the first six months, Russia had withdrawn her troops from the southwestern portion of the Sheng-King or Mukden province as far as the Liao river. Her pretended evacuation of the remainder of the Mukden province, including Mukden itself, appears to have been a mere farce or sham. See Asakawa, *op. cit.*, p. 239. There was not even a pretence at evacuation in the case of Niu-Chwang from which Russia had repeatedly promised to withdraw her troops.

²⁴ For the most authentic text of these demands published in England, see *China*, No. 2 (1904), No. 94. For the original Russian note sent by M. Plançon to Prince Ching, see *House Doc.* of 58th Cong., 2nd session, Vol. 1 (Foreign Rel.) pp. 56-58. In his interview of April 28, 1903, with Mr. McCormick, the American ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff denied in the most positive terms that such demands were made by the Russian Government, but the denial of Count Lamsdorff was partly offset by the admissions of Count Cassini in his remarkable interview published in the *New York Tribune* for May 1, 1903, cited by Asakawa, p. 249.

²⁵ *China*, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 79 ff. In a communication, dated April

An important step in the direction of strengthening the "open-door" policy in China was taken by the United States on October 8, 1903, the date which had been set for the final evacuation of Manchuria. On that date we concluded a commercial treaty with China which secured the opening of Mukden and An-Tung in Manchuria to international trade and settlement in spite of Russian opposition.²⁶

It was in strict accordance with a number of precedents that Secretary Hay took the initiative on February 10, 1904, in proclaiming that "the neutrality of China, and in all practicable ways her administrative entity,"²⁷ should be respected by Japan and Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. Although this proposal was said to have been made at the suggestion of Germany, the burden of enforcing it against Russia would undoubtedly have fallen upon Great Britain and the United States had such action become necessary. While the attitude of the Governments of both these countries toward Russia was entirely correct during the war—more so, in fact,

28, 1903, to Sir M. Herbert, Lord Lansdowne said it was the "desire and intention" of the British Government "to act in accordance with what we conceive to be the policy of the United States, namely, to open China impartially to the commerce of the whole world, to maintain her independence and integrity, and to insist upon the fulfilment of treaty and other obligations by the Chinese Government which they have contracted towards us." *Ibid.* No. 90.

²⁶ On the same day (October 8, 1903) there was also concluded a commercial treaty, providing for the opening to the world's trade of Mukden and Tatung-Kao, between China and Japan. On September 6, 1903, Russia had made six fresh demands on China. One of these demands implied that no foreign settlements or concessions to foreigners were in the future to be granted in Manchuria. These demands were rejected by the Chinese Government at the instigation of the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking. See *China*, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 147 ff., especially No. 156.

The attitude of Russia towards the rights and privileges of foreigners in Manchuria may be inferred from Count Benckendorff's admissions to Lord Lansdowne on July 11, 1903. He said in effect that "the Imperial Government [of Russia] have no intention of opposing the gradual opening by China, as commercial relations develop, of some towns in Manchuria to foreign commerce, *excluding, however, the right to establish 'Settlements.'*" *China*, No. 2 (1904), No. 133.

²⁷ *House Doc.* of 58th Congress, 3d session (For. Rel., 1904), p. 2.

than was the conduct of France and Germany toward Japan—nevertheless the sympathies and good wishes of the people of the United States as well as those of England were enlisted on the side of Japan. Admiration for the splendid fighting qualities of the Japanese, a fear of the Russian advance, a feeling that Japan was fighting our battle in the Far East, were sentiments common to the people of both countries. The governments of both countries made similar protests against the Russian doctrine of contraband, and our leading newspapers took the English side in every important controversy which arose between Russia and Great Britain, as *e. g.*, in respect to the seizure of the *Malacca*, the sinking of the *Knight Commander*, and the *North Sea Incident*.

Our American traditions and principles forbid our becoming a party to the recent offensive and defensive alliance between England and Japan, but our sympathies and interests are clearly enlisted on the side of that partnership. There exists a gradually growing conviction that the interests of Great Britain and the United States in the Orient are identical. In their Far Eastern policy both countries have aimed at the enlargement of commercial opportunities and the expansion of trade rather than at territorial aggrandizement or political control, whereas Russia, France and Germany appear to have sought after “spheres of interest” and “leases” with a view of acquiring special economic privileges or commercial monopolies for themselves. All that the people of England and America ask for is a fair field and an equal opportunity to enter into free and open competition with the other nations of the world for the markets of the East. In other words, the United States and England stand together in demanding a “square deal” in the Orient.